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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Markcus Raymond May appeals from the district court's dismissal, following an
evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the following factual background for this case:
May shot victim James Lambert in the leg with a 9mm pistol on May
29, 2010. He was charged with aggravated battery by using a firearm in
the commission of a battery, and not with the aggravated battery offense
of causing great bodily harm. There is no dispute that he in fact shot
Lambert, although he now contends he didn't intend to shoot him. There
is also no dispute that he had consumed significant amounts of
methamphetamine and alcohol in the 10-12 days prior to the incident.
May contends that he was suffering from hallucinations during the incident
and therefore suffered from a mental illness which might have provided a
defense in this case. No evidence supporting this contention, other than
May's testimony and some confirming testimony of his mother, was
presented at the evidentiary hearing. A psychological report prepared
following his plea and prior to sentencing concludes that May was
"feigning psychotic symptoms." The eluding charge arose when May fled
the scene of the shooting. He admitted at the change of plea hearing that
"I saw the lights, sirens, and I didn't pull over."
May was initially represented by Ben Anderson of the Twin Falls
Public Defender's Office. The relationship between May and Anderson
can best be described as "rocky." At times attorney and client got along
well. At other times they did not. One of the primary disputes between
attorney and client surrounded May's desire to defend this case based
upon being shot by police after the incident with Lambert, and Anderson's
disagreement with that approach. In addition, May told Anderson several
versions of the event which made formulation of a defense difficult.
May received and rejected several plea offers from the State before
finally accepting the final one forming the basis of his plea. By that plea
agreement the State recommended a 10-30 year sentence on the felony
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and 6 months in jail on the misdemeanor. May was free to argue for a
lesser sentence. On the day of his plea Anderson met with May in the jail
and a Guilty Plea Advisory Form was filled out. The final plea agreement
was also signed that day. Pleas were entered the same day and a
transcript of that plea hearing is part of the record before the Court. May
then filed a motion to withdraw his plea.
After entering his pleas, Attorney Tim Williams was appointed to
represent May. An evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw plea
was conducted and the Court denied the motion to withdraw his pleas.
May proceeded to sentencing. The trial court followed the State's
sentencing recommendation. May appealed. In its opinion, the Court of
Appeals concluded that "May was not pressured, that he understood the
sentencing terms, and that his acceptance of the plea agreement was
made voluntarily and knowingly." Specifically, the Court noted that May,
during the plea colloquy, May [sic] said "yes" []when asked if he knew he
could serve thirty years without parole.
(R., pp.72-74.)

May filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, that he was innocent of the charges, and that he
was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.

(R., pp.10-15.)

The district court held an

evidentiary hearing on May's petition. (R., pp.65-69.) Following the evidentiary hearing,
the district court denied May's post-conviction petition.
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.84-86.)
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(R., pp.71-82.)

May filed a

ISSUES
May raises two issues on appeal:
1.
Whether the trial court erred in not allowing a plea withdrawal: and
whether the district court erred in determining that Mr. May's plea was
knowing; willing; and without duress?
2.
Whether the district court erred in dismissing Mr. May's postconviction petition without applying an actual innocence standard of
review-and allowing evidentiary processes to make such an [sic]
determination[.]
(See Appellant's brief, p.4 (capitalization altered).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
The issue of whether May was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea was the subject
of his previous appeal in Docket No. 38835. Is he precluded under the doctrine of res
judicata from re-litigating this issue?
2.
Has May failed to show error in the district court's dismissal, following an
evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Claims That Have Previously Been Raised To And Decided By The Court Are Barred
Under The Doctrine Of Res Judicata
A.

Introduction
The issue of whether May is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea has previously

been raised to and decided by the Court of Appeals. This issue is therefore precluded
by the doctrine of res judicata.

B.

Standard Of Review
The question of whether an action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata is a

question of law over which an appellate court exercises free review. State v. Rhoades,
134 Idaho 862, 11 P.3d 481 (2000).

C.

May's Claim That He Is Entitled To Withdraw His Guilty Plea Is Barred Under
The Doctrine Of Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata prevents re-litigation of issues that have been

previously decided in a final judgment or decision in an action between the same
litigants. Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482. Similarly, claims which could
have been raised to the Court previously but were not are barred in subsequent
litigation by the principles of res judicata. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 766, 760
P.2d 1174, 1182 (1988). On May's prior appeal in Docket No. 38835, he argued that he
was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. See State v. May. Docket No. 38835, 2012
Unpublished Op. No. 566, 2 (Idaho Appeals, July 31, 2012).
determined that he was not. See

19.:. at 4-6.
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The Court of Appeals

Because this issue has been raised to and

decided by the Court previously, it is barred under the doctrine of res judicata and is not
properly before this Court.

11.
May Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Dismissing His Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing
A.

Introduction
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that, far from

proving his claims of actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel by a
preponderance of the evidence, May's claims were in fact disproved by the evidence,
and so denied his post-conviction petition. (R., pp.71-80.) On appeal, May contends
that he should have been granted relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel and
alleged actual innocence.

(See Appellant's brief.)

Application of the correct legal

standards to May's claims, however, shows that he failed to prove either claim. The
court properly denied May's petition for post-conviction relief and should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act are civil, where

there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision made after an
evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that decision will not be
disturbed on appeal. Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992).

C.

The District Court Properly Denied May's Post-Conviction Petition
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which the claim is based.
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I.C.R.

57(c); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). At an evidentiary
hearing, the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters within the province of the trial
court.

Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). The

district court's factual findings will not be disturbed if "supported by substantial, even if
conflicting, evidence in the record." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d
941,943 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (1983)).
On review of an order denying post-conviction relief, the lower court's decision that the
burden of proof has not been met is entitled to great weight, and a finding that a party
has failed to prove his claim will not be set aside unless that finding is clearly erroneous.
Larkin, 115 Idaho at 74, 764 P.2d at 441.
Applying relevant legal standards to the facts presented at May's evidentiary
hearing, the district court found that May had failed to prove his post-conviction claims.
(R., pp.76-80.) Regarding May's naked claim of innocence, the district court recognized
that such a claim was barred by application of Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b); May's guilt or
innocence could have been previously litigated and was determined by his guilty plea.
(Id.) Addressing the relative merits of May's claims, the district court found that his
testimony was not credible.

(Id.)

Not only were his assertions unsupported by the

record, they were in fact affirmatively disproved by it. (R., pp.79-80.) The state adopts
as part of its argument on appeal the district court's analysis from its "Memorandum
Opinion," a copy of which is attached as "Appendix A." May has failed to show that the
district court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief.
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Instead, May continues to claim ineffective assistance of counsel and assert his
innocence on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) But he has not shown, nor has he
even attempted to show, that the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. At an
evidentiary hearing, credibility determinations are the province of the trial court. Larkin,
115 Idaho at 73, 764 P.2d at 440. And the trial court found that May's testimony was
not credible. May failed to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. He
has failed to show that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. The order of the district
court denying and dismissing May's petition should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying May post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.

DATED this 30th day of December, 2014.

RUS
PENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of December, 2014, served true
and correct copies of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing two copies in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
MARKCUS RAYMOND MAY
IDOC #99474
ISCC
PO Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

RUSS
J.SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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DISTRICT COURT

C Fifth Judicial District
ounty of Twin Falls • state of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
MARKCUS RA YMONO MAY,
Case No. CV 2013-1240
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM OPINION

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
David Haley for Petitioner May.
Stan Holloway for Respondent State.
INTRODUCTION

May was originally charged with Aggravated Battery with an enhancement,
aggravated assault with an enhancement, burglary and felony eluding as a result of
conduct occurring in May 2010.

He proceeded thru a preliminary hearing and after

numerous plea offers and counteroffers pied guilty to the Aggravated Battery with a
weapon enhancement and the offense of misdemeanor eluding. He filed a motion to
withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. The Court denied that motion. He received a
sentence of 30 years, 10 fixed and 20 indeterminate on the aggravated battery and

MEMORANDUM OPINION - 1
71

-

weapons enhancement charge, and a 6 month jail sentence on the eluding charge.
May appealed the order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his sentence
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals by unpublished opinion filed July 31, 2013. May
has timely filed this post-conviction petition.
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on Oct 7, 8 and 10, 2013. The Court
received testimony from May, his mother and his trial attorneys and various documents,
mostly from the underlying criminal file. This matter taken under advisement at the end
of the hearing. This memorandum constitutes the Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52.
FACTS

May shot victim James Lambert in the leg with a 9mm pistol on May 29, 2010.
He was charged with aggravated battery by using a firearm in the commission of a
battery, and not with the aggravated battery offense of causing great bodily harm.
There is no dispute that he in fact shot Lambert, although he now contends he didn't
intend to shoot him. There is also no dispute that he had consumed significant amounts
of methamphetamine and alcohol in the 10-12 days prior to the incident. May contends
that he was suffering from hallucinations during the incident and therefore suffered from
a mental illness which might have provided a defense in this case.

No evidence

supporting this contention, other than May's testimony and some confirming testimony
of his mother, was presented at the evidentiary hearing.

A psychological report

prepared following his plea and prior to sentencing concludes that May was "feigning
psychotic symptoms."

The eluding charge arose when May fled the scene of the

MEMORANDUM OPINION - 2
72

shooting. He admitted at the change of plea hearing that "I saw the lights, sirens, and I
didn't pull over."
May was initially represented by Ben Anderson of the Twin Falls Public
Defender's Office. The relationship between May and Anderson can best be described
as "rocky." At times attorney and client got along well. At other times they did not. One
of the primary disputes between attorney and client surrounded May's desire to defend
this case based upon being shot by police after the incident with Lambert, and
Anderson's disagreement with that approach. In addition, May told Anderson several
versions of the event which made formulation of a defense difficult.
May received and rejected several plea offers from the State before finally
accepting the final one forming the basis of his plea. By that plea agreement the State
recommended a 10-30 year sentence on the felony and 6 months in jail on the
misdemeanor.

May was free to argue for a lesser sentence. On the day of his plea

Anderson met with May in the jail and a Guilty Plea Advisory Form was filled out. The
final plea agreement was also signed that day. Pleas were entered the same day and a
transcript of that plea hearing is part of the record before the Court. May then filed a
motion to withdraw his plea.
After entering his pleas, Attorney Tim Williams was appointed to represent May.
An evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw plea was conducted and the Court
denied the motion to withdraw his pleas. May proceeded to sentencing. The trial court
followed the State's sentencing recommendation.

May appealed.

In its opinion, the

Court of Appeals concluded that "May was not pressured, that he understood the
sentencing terms, and that his acceptance of the plea agreement was made voluntarily

MEMORANDUM OPINION - 3
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and knowingly." Specifically, the Court noted that May, during the plea colloquy, May
said "yes" "when asked if he knew he could serve thirty years without parole.
POST CONVICTION CLAIMS
May raises numerous claims in his pro se petition that was never amended prior
to the evidentiary hearing.
unconstitutional.

First, he asserts that the aggravated battery statute is

However, at hearing he clarified that he is not challenging the

constitutionality of the statute, but rather that his is simply not guilty either because he
didn't intend to shoot Lambert, suffered from a mental illness, or had diminished
capacity because of drug and alcohol intoxication.
Next he asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Those claims

include: a personal (not ethical) conflict of interest between May and Anderson; failing
to use important evidence; failing to object to improper evidence or testimony; failing to
properly argue appellate issues; and failure to properly advise May about his plea.
Specifically he claims that he should have had a competency hearing, that Anderson
lied and threatened him to plead guilty, Anderson failed to investigate, didn't file a
motion to challenge the enhancement allegation, failed to pursue defenses, and
misadvised May of the consequences of a unified sentence. He contends that Williams
didn't properly prepare him for the hearing on his motion to withdraw plea and didn't
submit letters from friends or family at sentencing.
GOVERNING AUTHORITY
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal,
proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145
Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008); see also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,

MEMORANDUM OPINION - 4
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724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for postconviction relief is based. LC.§ 19-4907: Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d
1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App.
2002). "An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary
civil action[.]" Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (quoting
Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628)). The application must contain much more

than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008);
Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628. The application must be verified with

respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records
or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must
state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. § 19-4903.
In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the
post-conviction procedure act. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient, and that the
defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App.
1995). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the

MEMORANDUM OPINION- 5
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applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. The Strickland two part standard applies to ineffective assistance claims
arising out of the plea process. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). To show prejudice,
a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's errors,
[defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Id., McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847 (2004). Stated slightly differently the petitioner

must show that counsel's deficient performance "affected the outcome of the plea
process." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
A post-conviction proceeding "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy
incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence of
conviction." I.C. §19-4901(b). Moreover, "[a]ny issue which could have been raised on
direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction
proceedings, unless it appears to the court on the basis of a substantial factual showing
by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial
doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due
diligence, have been presented earlier." Id.
ANALYSIS AND DECISION

May's claims for post-conviction relief fail for several reasons.

First and

foremost, his claims are barred by application of LC. §19-4901 (b). In his petition May
seeks "a new trial." Obviously he cannot have a "new" trial because there never was a
trial in his case. In effect his motion is to withdraw his plea and have a trial. Virtually
every issue raised in this post-conviction proceeding save one was explicitly and directly

MEMORANDUM OPINION - 6
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raised in his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty previously litigated in this case. I.C.
§ 19-4901 (b) bars this Court from reconsidering those issues which were adversely
determined against May in his direct appeal.

The one exception applicable here is

May's claim of innocence. That claim was not directly asserted in the hearing on motion
to withdraw plea.

May now raises claims of self-defense, mental incapacity, lack of

intent and accident.

All of the facts giving rise to these claims were known to May

during the change of plea hearing. That issue could have been raised in the motion to
withdraw plea and was not. May has not established ineffective assistance of counsel
in failing to raise that issue. Williams testified at the evidentiary hearing that he gave
May every opportunity to raise these and other issues at the hearing to withdraw plea
and even asked him open ended questions at the hearing so he could articulate the
"just cause" necessary to permit withdrawal of his plea. Indeed, May acknowledged his
guilt at the change of plea hearing and is deemed to waive any defenses to his guilt by
entry of his plea. Even if these issues had been considered by the trial court this Court
finds that his claim of innocence would not have been accepted by the trial court.

The

Court finds that all of May's claims are barred by application of the foregoing statute.
Moreover, this Court does not find that, even accepting May's testimony as true, which
this court does not, May has not established at the evidentiary hearing that he had a
viable defense to either aggravated battery or misdemeanor eluding.
Likewise, May seeks a modification of his sentence. May does not claim that the
State breached the plea agreement. At most, if relief was granted in this proceeding,
May would only be entitled to a new sentencing. This Court does not have the authority
to alter his sentence under the circumstances of this case. His complaint is that he

MEMORANDUM OPINION - 7
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assumed that the 20 year indeterminate portion of his sentence would be "suspended"
after he completes the 10 year fixed portion. He claims that Anderson told him this.
The Court specifically finds against this portion of May's claim. First, May's testimony
lacks credibility.

His testimony to the trial court and this Court is absolutely

contradictory. Either he perjured himself to the trial court or this Court. The guilty plea
advisory form advised May of the meaning of an indeterminate sentence. Judge Bevan
advised May that he could serve the complete 30 years. The plea offers made by May
himself (2 plus 6 and 3 plus 7) are clear indication that he understood the concept of a
unified sentence, even if he didn't understand the precise meaning of that word. As Mr.
Anderson explained at hearing, "suspended" applies to probation cases and there is
absolutely no evidence before this Court that May ever expected to receive probation in
this case. If May misunderstood the plea agreement (and the Court does not find that
he did), it is a consequence of his own action, not ineffective assistance of Anderson.
May's claims against Williams are likewise meritless. He says that Williams did
not properly "prep" him for the hearing where he testified in support of his motion to
withdraw plea.

The Court finds that this claim is frivolous and unsupported by the

record. Williams testified that he spent considerable time with May preparing for the
hearing.

It is not an attorney's job to tell a client what to say in court, and indeed

Williams did not. He explained the law to May and gave him every opportunity to state
his reasons for withdrawing his plea. May clearly responded to questions asked by
Williams and was given the opportunity to expand on other factors constituting "just
cause" for withdrawal of his plea. See May 12, 2011 Hearing on Motion to Withdraw
Plea, p. 36.

MEMORANDUM OPINION - 8
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May claims that Williams did not present character evidence at sentencing but
does not provide in this record what that evidence would have shown or how that could
have affected the sentence. Williams clearly testified that he would have presented any
character evidence that in his opinion was meritorious if that evidence was made
available to him. The decision to present evidence at sentencing is a strategic decision.
May has not carried his burden of proving either ineffective assistance of counsel or
prejudice on this issue.
Dismissal of a post-conviction proceeding is appropriate where the record from
the criminal action conclusively disproves the essential elements of the petitioner's
claims. Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897 (Ct. App. 1995). "Allegations are insufficient
for the grant of relief when they are clearly disproved by the record or do not justify relief
as a matter of law." Gootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (Ct. App. 1996). Such is the case
here. May's testimony at the evidentiary is absolutely contradicted by his statement's
under oath at the time of entry of his plea. May asserts that Anderson told him what to
say when answering the questions on the advisory form. The Court finds that
Anderson's explanation at evidentiary hearing that he didn't tell May what to say on the
form (other than that which he acknowledged at hearing) is credible and May's
testimony in this regard is not credible.

At the change of plea hearing May

acknowledged under oath that he was satisfied with Anderson's representation,
understood the meaning of a unified sentence, was competent to enter a plea and that
his plea to the charges waived any defenses he might have. At the end of the plea
colloquy the trial court found that May understood the nature of the charges to which he
pied guilty, understood the potential penalties, that the plea was knowing and voluntary,

MEMORANDUM OPINION - 9
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and that he in fact committed the crimes to which he pied guilty. May agreed on the
record with those findings.

The Court finds that the record before the trial court

conclusively disproves his allegations in this case.
CONCLUSION

May must prove both ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudice. He has
proven neither in this case. May's Petition shall be dismissed with prejudice.

II

~

·

DATED thisf-1- d§J.,y.,ofOctober, 2013.
'
/

r
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